Competing against experienced and inexperienced players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Competing against experienced and inexperienced players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1137.91341
author: Robert L. Slonim
published in: Experimental Economics
publication date: 2006-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5009103
zbMATH Keywords: Game Theory
zbMATH Keywords: Learning
zbMATH Keywords: Experimental Methods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10683-005-0437-3
OpenAlex ID: W1963631188
cites work: Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation
cites work: Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
cites work: Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
cites work: Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games
cites work: Partners and strangers revisited
cites work: Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
cites work: Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
cites work: Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
cites work: On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
cites work: `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
DOI: 10.1007/S10683-005-0437-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5009103