Approval voting with endogenous candidates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Approval voting with endogenous candidates
zbMATH Open document ID: 1129.91014
author: Arnaud Dellis
author: Mandar P. Oak
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2006-03-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 5009852
zbMATH Keywords: approval voting
zbMATH Keywords: citizen-candidate model
zbMATH Keywords: comparison of electoral systems
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2004.10.010
OpenAlex ID: W2107598618
cites work: An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
cites work: Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
cites work: Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
cites work: Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
cites work: A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
cites work: Analyzing a nail-biting election
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2004.10.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5009852