Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1129.91322
author: Tibor Neugebauer
author: Reinhard Selten
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2006-03-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/49567
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62-07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 5009858
zbMATH Keywords: experimental economics
zbMATH Keywords: first-price sealed-bid auctions
zbMATH Keywords: independent private value model
zbMATH Keywords: computerized competitors
zbMATH Keywords: bidding theory
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
describes a project that uses: RatImage
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2063731503
cites work: Q4805737
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cites work: Learning direction theory and the winner's curse
cites work: Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2005.10.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5009858