Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1094.91013
author: David A. Malueg
author: Andrew J. Yates
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-03-21T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors consider symmetric rent-seeking contests and assume that the contest success function satisfies a natural collection of properties, including homogeneity of degree zero. In these conditions they prove that if a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, then this equilibrium is unique. Moreover, a sufficient condition for the existence of such equilibrium is obtained. Finally, the authors consider two specific contest success functions taken from the literature. In both cases the required properties are satisfied and the results provided are used to look for symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5013641
zbMATH Keywords: pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
reviewed by: Ignacio García-Jurado
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-004-0554-9
OpenAlex ID: W1999411617
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-004-0554-9
Recommended article: Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
Recommended article: Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
Recommended article: Equilibria of homogeneous functionals in the fair-competition regime
Recommended article: On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
Recommended article: Q5314912
Recommended article: The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest
Recommended article: Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
Recommended article: THE STABILITY OF DYNAMIC RENT-SEEKING GAMES
Recommended article: Q3993194
Recommended article: The asymptotic behavior of dynamic rent-seeking games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5013641