Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game?
author: Zheng Chen
author: Zhaoquan Gu
author: Yuexuan Wang
published in: Theoretical Computer Science
publication date: 2021-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Qxx
zbMATH DE Number: 7401222
zbMATH Keywords: max-min
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional game
zbMATH Keywords: fair allocation
zbMATH Keywords: envy-freeness
zbMATH Keywords: resource exchange
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tcs.2021.07.020
OpenAlex ID: W3184401543
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DOI: 10.1016/J.TCS.2021.07.020
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7401222