Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1480.91150
author: N. E. Zubov
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 65C05
zbMATH DE Number: 7447291
zbMATH Keywords: law of large numbers
zbMATH Keywords: Monte Carlo sampling process
zbMATH Keywords: one-way Fubini property
zbMATH Keywords: Hilbert space
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-020-01318-5
OpenAlex ID: W3094257606
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-020-01318-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7447291