Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1484.91232
author: Jung S. You
author: Ruben Juarez
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7447304
zbMATH Keywords: resource sharing
zbMATH Keywords: cost sharing
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: envy-free
zbMATH Keywords: VCG mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-021-01342-z
OpenAlex ID: W3128191509
cites work: Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
cites work: Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Q3208356
cites work: Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
cites work: Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
cites work: Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
cites work: Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
cites work: Sharing sequential values in a network
cites work: Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
cites work: Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
cites work: An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
cites work: Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
cites work: Q3624066
cites work: Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
cites work: Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
cites work: Computationally manageable combinational auctions
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
cites work: Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
cites work: A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
cites work: Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
cites work: Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
cites work: Automata, Languages and Programming
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-021-01342-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7447304