Decentralized college admissions under single application
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Decentralized college admissions under single application
zbMATH Open document ID: 1483.91134
author: Somouaoga Bonkoungou
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2021-12-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7449606
zbMATH Keywords: college admission
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized market
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: refinement
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-020-00241-4
OpenAlex ID: W3120344594
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-020-00241-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7449606