The importance of expertise in group decisions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The importance of expertise in group decisions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1457.91152
author: Alexander Lundberg
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2021-01-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 7290457
zbMATH Keywords: group decisions
zbMATH Keywords: expertise
zbMATH Keywords: social welfare
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-020-01253-3
OpenAlex ID: W3020515730
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-020-01253-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7290457