The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance
zbMATH Open document ID: 1460.91082
author: Burkhard C. Schipper
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2021-05-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7344798
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: Knightian uncertainty
zbMATH Keywords: Choquet expected utility
zbMATH Keywords: neo-additive capacity
zbMATH Keywords: Hurwicz criterion
zbMATH Keywords: minimax
zbMATH Keywords: supermodularity
zbMATH Keywords: aggregative games
zbMATH Keywords: monotone comparative statics
zbMATH Keywords: playing the field
zbMATH Keywords: evolution of preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3135326836
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-021-09800-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7344798