Persuasion under ambiguity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Persuasion under ambiguity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91093
author: Jonas Hedlund
author: T. Florian Kauffeldt
author: Malte Lammert
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2021-05-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7344799
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-020-09764-2
OpenAlex ID: W3038185405
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-020-09764-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7344799