Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
zbMATH Open document ID: 1168.91332
author: Yogeshwer Sharma
author: David P. Williamson
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-08-27T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1813/5739
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
zbMATH DE Number: 5599112
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: centrally controlled flow
zbMATH Keywords: altruistic flow
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg threshold
zbMATH Keywords: price of anarchy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2083663874
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5599112