The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1173.91016
author: Jay Surti
author: Yuk-fai Fong
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-08-27T00:00:00Z
review text: Consider an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (2 players), with different rates of discount and side-payments. The paper characterizes the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, for all possible discount rate configurations (nicely summarized in figure 1). When the difference in the discount rates is sufficiently large, Pareto payoffs are supported by side payments from the impatient to the patient player, and cooperation is less than complete.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5599119
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: side payments
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2008.11.004
OpenAlex ID: W1997396773
cites work: Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
cites work: Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
cites work: Why to buy your darling flowers: On cooperation and exploitation
cites work: Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
cites work: Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
cites work: Renegotiation in repeated games
cites work: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
cites work: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
cites work: Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information on one side: The case of different discount factors
cites work: The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
cites work: Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
cites work: On Repeated Games with Complete Information
cites work: Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.11.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5599119