Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
zbMATH Open document ID: 1180.91173
author: Helmut Bester
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-09-09T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13481/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5602502
zbMATH Keywords: authority
zbMATH Keywords: decision rights
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect information
zbMATH Keywords: theory of the firm
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2057258689
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0395-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5602502