Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1190.91079
author: Kentaro Hatsumi
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-09-09T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: DP0686-RR-N.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 5602540
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2170591035
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-009-0370-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5602540