Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91052
author: Mark Fey
author: Kristopher W. Ramsay
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2009-09-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5601513
zbMATH Keywords: conflict
zbMATH Keywords: war
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: war consistency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-008-0055-6
OpenAlex ID: W2096441769
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-008-0055-6
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5601513