Constrained school choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Constrained school choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91034
author: Guillaume Haeringer
author: Flip Klijn
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-09-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 67106.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5603590
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: top trading cycles
zbMATH Keywords: Boston mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: acyclic priority structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1977766010
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5603590