The value of information for auctioneers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The value of information for auctioneers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91056
author: M. Hagedorn
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-09-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 5603601
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous information
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information structures
zbMATH Keywords: common values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.04.002
OpenAlex ID: W2009612355
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.04.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5603601