Can the majority lose the election?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can the majority lose the election?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1195.91031
author: Bryan C. McCannon
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2010-01-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5659520
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous candidates
zbMATH Keywords: majority losing
zbMATH Keywords: non-Duvergerian outcomes
zbMATH Keywords: plurality voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-008-0072-5
OpenAlex ID: W3123749015
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-008-0072-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5659520