Simple games with many effective voters
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Simple games with many effective voters
zbMATH Open document ID: 1197.91079
author: Eyal Beigman
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-02-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5666100
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: committee voting
zbMATH Keywords: simple games
zbMATH Keywords: indeterminacy
zbMATH Keywords: Ramsey theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2009.03.015
OpenAlex ID: W2092008736
cites work: Social choice and individual values
cites work: Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
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cites work: Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
cites work: A dictionary for voting paradoxes
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cites work: The Voting Problem
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cites work: Q4103529
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.015
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666100