Public information and electoral bias
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Public information and electoral bias
zbMATH Open document ID: 1197.91082
author: Curtis R. Taylor
author: Huseyin Yildirim
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2010-02-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
zbMATH DE Number: 5666122
zbMATH Keywords: costly voting
zbMATH Keywords: public information
zbMATH Keywords: electoral bias
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2009.06.007
OpenAlex ID: W2045929118
cites work: Private polling in elections and voter welfare
cites work: Q4836494
cites work: Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
cites work: Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
cites work: Welfare reducing polls
cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
cites work: Population uncertainty and Poisson games
cites work: Large Poisson games
cites work: Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666122