Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
zbMATH Open document ID: 1197.91083
author: Olivier Bochet
author: François Maniquet
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2010-02-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 2006-43.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5666189
zbMATH Keywords: virtual implementation
zbMATH Keywords: admissible support
zbMATH Keywords: extended monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: Maskin monotonicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2267374399
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.06.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666189