Transparency and special interests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Transparency and special interests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1182.91155
author: Mike Felgenhauer
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2010-02-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 5668201
zbMATH Keywords: bribes
zbMATH Keywords: corruption
zbMATH Keywords: common agency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2009.08.026
OpenAlex ID: W2081762172
cites work: Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
cites work: The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
cites work: The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.08.026
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5668201