Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
zbMATH Open document ID: 1182.91100
author: Prasenjit Banerjee
author: Jason F. Shogren
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2010-02-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 5668213
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: environmental risk
zbMATH Keywords: information rent
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2009.09.021
OpenAlex ID: W1984213640
cites work: Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.09.021
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5668213