A contraction principle for finite global games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A contraction principle for finite global games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1188.91043
author: Laurent Mathevet
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-02-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-112102549
review text: The main objective of this paper is to give a new proof on the uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. This is done by showing that the best-reply mapping is weak contractive. Moreover, this contraction result provides the intuition that the noise structure in games lessens complementarities so that a unique equilibrium survives.
reviewed by: Anna Jaskiewicz
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 5673392
zbMATH Keywords: global game
zbMATH Keywords: supermodular game
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium uniqueness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2091608359
cites work: Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
cites work: Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
cites work: Bayes theory
cites work: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
cites work: Q4301147
cites work: The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses
cites work: Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs
cites work: Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
cites work: Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0411-3
Recommended article: Contraction of simple games and its applications
Recommended article: Q5314192
Recommended article: An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games
Recommended article: Convergence in games with continua of equilibria
Recommended article: Simple equilibria in finite games with convexity properties
Recommended article: Q3730305
Recommended article: On the invariance of solutions of finite games
Recommended article: Q4945454
Recommended article: Convergence and approximation in potential games
Recommended article: Convergence and Approximation in Potential Games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5673392