Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
zbMATH Open document ID: 1189.03008
author: Paul Elbourne
published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic
publication date: 2010-03-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5676577
zbMATH Keywords: propositions
zbMATH Keywords: possible worlds
zbMATH Keywords: situation semantics
zbMATH Keywords: direct reference
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10992-009-9112-z
OpenAlex ID: W1968831112
cites work: Q4951952
cites work: Dynamic predicate logic
cites work: Q3158562
cites work: Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
DOI: 10.1007/S10992-009-9112-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5676577