Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
zbMATH Open document ID: 1202.91026
author: Satoru Takahashi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-03-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
zbMATH DE Number: 5677375
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: random matching
zbMATH Keywords: community enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: belief-free equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: first-order information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.06.003
OpenAlex ID: W2141441486
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.06.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5677375