Two-sided matching with interdependent values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two-sided matching with interdependent values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1202.91234
author: Archishman Chakraborty
author: Alessandro Citanna
author: Michael Ostrovsky
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-03-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5677377
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent values
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: matching
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.07.004
OpenAlex ID: W2097909533
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.07.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5677377