A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1202.91023
author: Bo Chen
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-03-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5677391
zbMATH Keywords: repeated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric private monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: belief-based approach
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.05.006
OpenAlex ID: W2170536495
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5677391