Cores of non-atomic market games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cores of non-atomic market games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1102.91010
author: Massimiliano Amarante
author: Fabio Maccheroni
author: Massimo Marinacci
author: Luigi Montrucchio
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2006-11-07T00:00:00Z
review text: The referred paper contributes to the theory of values of exchange economies with a continuum of players, and to the theory of the core of the market games related to the considered economy model. It is shown that the cores of all market games are norm compact subsets of non-atomic measures. Moreover, this result can be formulated for market games based on the properties of their non-atomic extensions and on generalizations of the linear production games. It is shown, as well, that the cores of the generalized linear production games admit a convenient representation. Some of those results are interpreted in the Multiple Priors model.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
zbMATH DE Number: 5071128
zbMATH Keywords: Market game
zbMATH Keywords: Transferable utility
zbMATH Keywords: Core
zbMATH Keywords: Exchange economy
zbMATH Keywords: Non-atomic measures
zbMATH Keywords: Multiple Priors model
zbMATH Keywords: Continuum of players
reviewed by: Milan Mareš
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-006-0029-2
OpenAlex ID: W2040993172
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DOI: 10.7916/D8R21CK3
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0029-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5071128