Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1101.91012
author: Guiomar Martín-Herrán
author: Georges Zaccour
published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
publication date: 2006-11-27T00:00:00Z
review text: The credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-state differential games is characterized. A general condition for credibility is obtained and its use is illustrated in two differential games taken from the literature on environmental economics and knowledge accumulation. It is shown that the proposed linear incentive strategies are not always credible. Alternative nonlinear credible strategies are provided.
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 49N70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 5076383
zbMATH Keywords: linear-state differential games
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: incentive equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: credibility
zbMATH Keywords: environmental economics
zbMATH Keywords: knowledge accumulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10957-005-4722-2
OpenAlex ID: W2018020262
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DOI: 10.1007/S10957-005-4722-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5076383