Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
zbMATH Open document ID: 1120.91019
author: Bruno Jullien
author: Bernard Salanié
author: François Salanié
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-11-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: salanie jullien.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
zbMATH DE Number: 5076549
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2163031017
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-005-0040-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5076549