Social norms, cooperation and inequality
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social norms, cooperation and inequality
zbMATH Open document ID: 1120.91003
author: Pedro Dal Bó
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-11-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wp802.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
zbMATH DE Number: 5076554
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: discrimination
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1541045608
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-005-0045-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5076554