Public trust and government betrayal
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Public trust and government betrayal
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91661
author: Christopher Phelan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-12-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
zbMATH DE Number: 5077781
zbMATH Keywords: government reputation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2005.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W2000685927
cites work: Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
cites work: Reputation in dynamic games
cites work: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
cites work: Repeated bargaining with persistent private information
cites work: Reputation and imperfect information
cites work: Who wants a good reputation?
cites work: Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.03.003
DOI: 10.21034/SR.283
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5077781