Internet auctions with many traders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Internet auctions with many traders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91402
author: Michael Peters
author: Sergei Severinov
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-12-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: UT-ECIPA-PETERS-01-01.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5077789
zbMATH Keywords: decentralization
zbMATH Keywords: trading mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: internet
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3124772755
cites work: Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
cites work: Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
cites work: Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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cites work: Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
cites work: Q3999327
cites work: Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
cites work: The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
cites work: Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
cites work: A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.04.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5077789