Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91394
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2006-12-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5077806
zbMATH Keywords: revenue ranking
zbMATH Keywords: open and sealed-bid auctions
zbMATH Keywords: linear bidding model
zbMATH Keywords: lumber auctions
author: Harrison H. C. Cheng
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2006.05.008
OpenAlex ID: W3124614771
cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
cites work: Asymmetric Auctions
cites work: Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
cites work: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
cites work: A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.05.008
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5077806