A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1141.91316
author: Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga
author: Issofa Moyouwou
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2006-12-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5078160
zbMATH Keywords: stability set
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
zbMATH Keywords: weak orders
zbMATH Keywords: fundamental cycles
Wikidata QID: Q56767858
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W2028612444
cites work: The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
cites work: A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
cites work: The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
cites work: The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
cites work: Stability of decision systems under majority rule
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5078160