Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91310
author: Michihiro Kandori
author: Ichiro Obara
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2006-12-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Obara275.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5080693
zbMATH Keywords: Efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: Garbling
zbMATH Keywords: Imperfect public monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: Prisoners' dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: Repeated games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2067176125
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
cites work: Moral hazard and private monitoring
cites work: Q5829371
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cites work: Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
cites work: Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
cites work: Internal correlation in repeated games
cites work: On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
cites work: The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
cites work: Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0032-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5080693