All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91411
author: Gadi Fibich
author: Arieh Gavious
author: Aner Sela
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2006-12-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 5080695
zbMATH Keywords: Private-value auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Risk aversion
zbMATH Keywords: Perturbation analysis
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-006-0034-5
OpenAlex ID: W2117339108
cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information
cites work: Q3207312
cites work: Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
cites work: Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
cites work: Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
cites work: An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: \(k\)-price auctions
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
cites work: Q3712069
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0034-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5080695