Candidate stability and voting correspondences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Candidate stability and voting correspondences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91429
author: Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2007-01-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: WRAP Rodriguez Alvarez twerp666.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5082035
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2130399840
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0126-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5082035