Endogenous voting agendas
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous voting agendas
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91423
author: John Duggan
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2007-01-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5082039
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-006-0143-x
OpenAlex ID: W2034002335
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0143-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5082039