Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91422
author: Vincent Anesi
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2007-01-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5082042
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-006-0146-7
OpenAlex ID: W2088936449
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0146-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5082042