Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91382
author: Bo Larsson
author: Lars-Gunnar Svensson
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2007-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5116319
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof voting
zbMATH Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
zbMATH Keywords: Barberà-Sonnenschein-Zhou theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008
OpenAlex ID: W2109916177
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.008
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5116319