\(p\)-best response set
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: \(p\)-best response set
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91345
author: Olivier Tercieux
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-01-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5083109
zbMATH Keywords: set-valued concept
zbMATH Keywords: \(p\)-dominance
zbMATH Keywords: risk-dominance
zbMATH Keywords: perfect foresight dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: higher-order uncertainty
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2005.06.001
OpenAlex ID: W1596300998
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.06.001
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5083109