Private monitoring in auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Private monitoring in auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91470
author: Andreas Blume
author: Paul Heidhues
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-01-09T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: ii03-14.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5083114
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: tacit collusion
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: cartels
zbMATH Keywords: withholding information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123642771
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5083114