A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
zbMATH Open document ID: 1138.91384
author: Hervé Crès
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2007-01-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
zbMATH DE Number: 5118201
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-006-0138-7
OpenAlex ID: W2056509672
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0138-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5118201