Credible implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Credible implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1153.91398
author: Bhaskar Chakravorty
author: Luis Corchón
author: Simon Wilkie
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-01-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 5118740
zbMATH Keywords: credibility
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2005.09.001
OpenAlex ID: W4233238550
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5118740