Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
zbMATH Open document ID: 1153.91307
author: Dan Bernhardt
author: John Duggan
author: Francesco Squintani
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-142748283
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5125305
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2164679170
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5125305