Market design with endogenous preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Market design with endogenous preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1151.91460
author: Aviad Heifetz
author: Ella Segev
author: Eric Talley
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1321
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5125310
zbMATH Keywords: market design
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122376464
cites work: Q4783379
cites work: Robust Mechanism Design
cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information
cites work: Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
cites work: Game theory
cites work: The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
cites work: What to maximize if you must
cites work: A review of WTA/WTP studies
cites work: The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
cites work: Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
cites work: The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
cites work: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
cites work: Introducing to the evolution of preferences
cites work: Preference evolution and reciprocity
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5125310