Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
zbMATH Open document ID: 1153.91691
author: Bettina Klaus
author: Flip Klijn
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 60404.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 5125311
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: couples
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: random paths
zbMATH Keywords: responsiveness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2145015113
cites work: Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
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cites work: Q3999327
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5125311